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1. Introduction
Education opens doors. The more successful students are in school, the more options they will 
have later on in life. Student performance, most often measured by objective test scores, depends 
on a number of factors, one of which is the level of effort students put forth to learn the material. 
Motivating students to work harder in school, therefore, is a worthwhile pursuit. A large 
literature on loss aversion and reference dependent preferences suggests that people are more 
responsive to incentives framed as losses than to incentives framed as gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Ariely et al. 2005). We conduct a field experiment 
to test if loss aversion behavior can be exploited to improve student performance in an 
undergraduate statistics course.  To do so, we manipulate the framing of the grading scales 
across statistics classes in the same semester. In one treatment, the class starts with zero points 
and students are given the opportunity to gain up to 560 points. In the other, the class starts with 
560 points (100 percent) and students can only incur losses from their performance. Our 
hypothesis, informed by theories of loss aversion and reference dependent preferences (e.g., 
Köszegi and Rabin 2006), is that students that start with 100 percent will exert more effort to 
keep their high grades in comparison to students that start with zero and work their way up from 
low grades. Although we only imperfectly observe effort levels (i.e., attendance), we observe 
outcomes (grades) that depend on effort levels. 
Related behavioral research has explored the use of material incentives (money and 
trophies) to exploit loss aversion related to student performance (Fryer et al. 2012; Levitt et al. 
2012).
1
 In these studies rewards are either paid in response to good student performance (gains) 
or taken away in response to poor performance (losses). The results from Fryer et al. (2012), in 
which teachers earned/lost rewards conditional on student performance, suggest that the 
incentive structure matters; students performed significantly better when teachers were under the 
threat of losing a financial reward compared to the promise of earning an equivalent one. On the 
other hand, Levitt et al. (2012) find no difference in performance when students could either gain 
or lose material rewards. Although our study is closely related to this literature, our experiment 
does not rely on material incentives. The experimental design simply varies the frame in which 
students’ grades are reported throughout a semester. The approach, therefore, has the potential to 
be a very cost-effective method to incentivize students. Our motivating hypothesis is based on 
the idea that preferences, in part, are reference dependent. Our theory presumes that students 
have a prior subjective range of “acceptable grades” in the course, and that when students are in 
this range they will work relatively harder to avoid a lower grade than they will to earn a higher 
one.   
Our overarching hypothesis and experimental design is similar to a recently published 
study by Apostolova-Mihaylova et al. (2015). Their study, like ours, was conducted during the 
2012-2013 academic year.
2
 In contrast to our study, they did not find a significant treatment 
effect between their treatment group (losing points) and the control group (earning points). 
However, they do find a significant difference in how males and females reacted to the 
experimental frame. They show that men in the treatment group scored significantly higher than 
1
 A much larger literature explores the effects of material and non-material rewards on student performance without 
appealing to the behavioral economics of loss aversion (e.g., Angrist and Lavy 2009; Azmat and Iriberri 2010; 
Bettinger 2010; Leuven et al. 2010; Fryer 2011, 2013) 
2
 Our study and Apostovola-Mihaylova et al. (2015) were conducted concurrently, but without knowledge of each 
other’s experiment or research agenda. 
men in the control group. Conversely, women earned significantly lower grades in the treatment 
group.   
Our results differ in important ways from Apostolova-Mihaylova et al. (2015). Consistent 
with our hypothesis, we find that students part of the “loss” treatment (starting with 560 points) 
earn statistically higher grades than students in the “gain” treatment (starting with zero points). 
Also consistent with a theory of reference dependent preferences, we observe changes in the 
relative performance between the two treatments over time. Most importantly, students in the 
loss treatment were more likely to attempt the final exam and their average grade on the final 
was statistically higher. We do not observe significant differences across gender.   
2. Theory and experimental design
Our hypotheses are derived from the established theory on loss aversion and reference dependent 
preferences from psychology and behavioral economics (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). We, 
therefore, do not offer a formal theory. However, because participants in our experiment start off 
in the extremes of possible outcomes, it is useful to characterize how reference points play a role 
in relative effort levels and, indirectly, student performance. 
Figure 1 shows a grading scale from zero to 100 percent. Students either work their way 
up from zero or down from 100. The rectangular bars represent the effort levels exerted by 
students within the different grading ranges. Students starting at zero, exert a relatively high level 
of effort to move from failure into their subjective range of acceptable grades (from some lower 
threshold to 100 percent). Once a student that starts from below crosses the threshold into her 
acceptable range her effort level drops. That is, once in the acceptable range she exerts less effort 
to earn a higher acceptable grade than she would to move from an unacceptable to acceptable 
one. Students that start with 100 percent, on the other hand, exert effort to avoid losing their high 
grade. Leaning on the theory of loss aversion, students within the acceptable grade range are 
expected to exert less effort to make gains in their grade relative to the corresponding effort level 
students put forth to avoid losses.  
Figure 1: Loss aversion and student effort 
The experiment was conducted during the Fall 2012 academic semester at Appalachian State 
University. The course number (ECO 2200), instructor, materials and assessment activities were 
held constant across the three sections, only the framing of the grading scale varied. The 
assessment activities included quizzes (seven), problem sets (four), exams (four) and active 
participation (iClicker performance). In one class - the gain treatment - students started with zero 
points and earned points up to 560, and in the other two classes - the loss treatment - students 
started with 560 points and lost points conditional on performance. A student’s percentage grade 
was calculated as 100*(Total Points/560). The grading interface was constructed in Excel and an 
active link to the grade book was embedded into the course website. With both grading formats, 
the students’ current number of points (lost or gained), percentage grade and letter grades was 
continuously updated and posted throughout the semester.  
The 560 points were broken down as follows. There were three in-semester exams and a 
comprehensive final exam that could be used to replace the lowest of the three in-semester 
exams. The three highest exams accounted for 300 points (each about 18 percent of the course 
grade). There were seven quizzes, each worth 20 points, and the lowest quiz grade was dropped. 
Quizzes therefore accounted for 120 points. Four problem sets each accounted for 20 points (80 
in total) and active participation accounted for 60 points. Note that active participation was made 
up of 1/3 attendance and 2/3 performance using classroom clickers. 
One element of the grading scheme that is particularly important is how the final exam 
plays its role. The final exam is offered during a week after the semester comes to a close, so 
when a student debates whether to take the final exam all other grades have been computed. 
Therefore, students in the gain treatment are shown their semester grade given a final exam score 
of zero. On the other hand, students in the loss treatment are shown their grade given a final 
exam score of 100. Students, in either treatment, could plug in their expected grade for the final 
exam to view their expected course grade. 
Our sample consisted of 177 business students that each attended one of three statistics 
courses. The duration of the courses was one hour and fifteen minutes and they were held back-
to-back-to back, with start times of 9:30, 11:00 and 12:30. Students were free to register for any 
of the three courses once their registration period opened.
3
 The 9:30 and 12:30 classes served as 
the loss treatments (starting with 560 points), and the 11:00 class served as the gain treatment 
(starting with 0 points). There were 56, 66, and 55 students in the 9:30, 11:00 and 12:30 classes, 
respectively. The same classroom was used for all three courses and spaces remained open in all 
three throughout the semester (registration was capped at 72). In total, 111 students participated 
in the loss treatment and 66 students participated in the gain treatment.  Overall, sixty eight 
percent (121) of the students were Male.
4
  
3. Results
We want to test whether students that started with 100 percent and received their grading 
feedback framed as losses performed better than students starting with zero and working their 
way up. When analyzing the unconditional results using a pairwise t-test to compare overall 
course grades, we do not find a significant effect across treatments. The average grades were an 
81.7 and an 82.19 in the loss and gain treatments respectively (p = 0.696).
5,6
 The study was 
3
 The opening of the registration period was scattered for students depending on how many credit hours they have 
earned. Students with more credits had priority in the sense that their registration period started earlier. All three 
courses had a similar pattern of enrollment throughout the entire registration period and none of the classes reached 
the enrollment cap of 72.     
4
 We recognize that the study would have benefited from more balanced sample sizes between the two treatments. 
Given the teaching assignment constraints this was not possible.  
5
 Apostolova-Mihaylova et al. (2015) report no significant difference in average grades between their control 
(grades framed as gains relative to zero) and their treatment (grades framed as losses relative to 100) when not 
designed, however, to control for other observable factors that could affect performance 
independent of how the grading scheme was framed. We collected data on students’ GPA, SAT 
score, attendance, their numeric grade from their previous statistics course, the number of hours 
they study per week (for all classes combined), gender and whether they attempted the final 
exam.
7
 We did not include a variable for their particular major because our sample is limited to 
business or aspiring business majors and many of them only report intended majors at this stage 
in their academic career.   
          Table I reports the results from linear models regressing a student’s percentage grade for 
the course on the aforementioned variables. From the initial 177 observations, 32 were dropped 
due to missing observations in one or more of the explanatory variables.  Of the remaining 145 
observations, 56 were from the gain treatment and 89 were from the loss treatment (47 and 42 
students in the early and late section, respectively).
8
 The first column of results in Table I is from 
a pooled model (all 145 observations) regressing course grade on the treatment dummy and the 
control variables, excluding the dummy variable whether the student attempted the final. Recall 
that the nature of the final exam in this class is particularly important. Students in the gain 
treatment decided whether to attempt the final knowing it can only improve upon their current 
course grade (replacing lowest grade), whereas students in the loss treatment had a default final 
course grade of 100 before attempting the final, and therefore earning a grade lower than 100 on 
the final would likely lower their current course grade. We run separate models to better isolate 
the effect attempting the final exam has on course grades.   
controlling for the interaction between gender and treatment. However, their result is not directly comparable 
because they do not report the results from a two-sample test on the unconditional means.  
6
 The Wilcoxon rank-sum test also indicates that the two samples come from identical populations (p = 0.893). 
7
 GPA, SAT, previous statistics grade and hours studying were self-reported through a survey administered through 
the course website. The number of classes attended was gathered from the iClicker system.  
8
 A t-test comparing the unconditional average grades with the 145 remaining observations again reveals that there is 
no statistical difference between the gain and loss treatment (p = 0.650). Moreover, there is no statistical difference 
in average grades between the two classes (early and late) that make up the loss treatment (p = 0.355). 
Table I: Course grades as a function of treatment and control variables 
Pooled Pooled Gains Losses 
Loss Treatment 1.961* 
(1.109) 
2.492** 
(1.103) 
--- --- 
Attendance 0.632*** 
(0.205) 
0.607*** 
(0.200) 
0.407 
(0.427) 
0.698*** 
(0.237) 
GPA 8.089*** 
(1.593) 
6.999*** 
(1.611) 
5.828* 
(2.994) 
7.726*** 
(1.960) 
Stats 1 Grade 0.250*** 
(0.083) 
0.254*** 
(0.081) 
0.343*** 
(0.132) 
0.225** 
(0.106) 
SAT -0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Hours Studying 0.136 
(0.086) 
0.096 
(0.086) 
-0.094 
(0.148) 
0.210* 
(0.108) 
Female -0.964 
(1.201) 
-0.803 
(1.177) 
0.451 
(1.941) 
-1.346 
(1.541) 
Attempted Final --- -3.036*** 
(1.137) 
-3.634* 
(1.892) 
-2.138 
(1.513) 
Constant 21.857*** 
(7.461) 
27.005*** 
(7.549) 
27.934*** 
(10.079) 
26.523*** 
(9.711) 
N 145 145 56 89 
R-squared 0.414 0.443 0.452 0.472 
F 13.80 13.50 5.65 10.33 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively.   
From the first column in Table I we see that conditioning for other potential factors that affect 
students’ performance, framing grades as losses as opposed to gains leads to statistically higher 
average course grades. The effect is weak, however, only significant at the 0.10 level. We also 
see that attendance, GPA, and Stats 1 grade have a significant and positive effect on performance 
at the 0.01 level.
9
  
When we include the dummy variable for whether the student attempted the final exam 
(second column in Table I), the qualitative impact of the loss frame remains but with greater 
significance (now at the 5% level). The overall result suggests that a simple, and costless, twist 
to a grading scheme can successfully exploit loss-aversion behavior and lead to improved student 
performance. The estimate from the second model in Table I suggests that students’ grades are 
on average 2.492 percent points higher in the loss treatment compared to the gain treatment, and 
this difference is significant (p = 0.031).  
We also see that attempting the final exam is associated with significantly lower course 
grades. To explore this result further we estimate regression models stratified by treatment. From 
the third and fourth columns in Table I we observe that attempting the final is associated with 
lower course grades in the gain treatment (at the 0.10 level) but is not associated with a 
significant change in course grades in the loss treatment. Perhaps this is because in the gain 
9
 To rule out the possibility of a section effect between the two classes that combine to form the loss treatment, we 
ran an additional regression using only data from the loss treatment. We regressed course grades on the remaining 
explanatory variables along with a section dummy variable. The coefficient was insignificant (p = 0.316) indicating 
the two sections are statistically equivalent.  
treatment those attempting the final are more likely to be struggling students (those trying to 
reach their acceptable grade range) whereas in the loss treatment there is more heterogeneity in 
the types of students attempting the exam. We will explore the final exam further in a moment.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, we hypothesize that students are more responsive to potential 
losses than they are to gains once they reach their acceptable grade range. Given this conjecture, 
we should expect to see more dramatic differences in effort (and resulting grades) at the end of 
the semester when students that started from zero have potentially crossed the threshold into their 
acceptable grade range. The column headings in Table II contain all of the graded assignments 
given throughout the semester (PS denotes problem sets, Q denotes quizzes and E denotes 
exams). The table includes the average course grades for each assignment by treatment. For each 
assignment we estimated a linear regression using the same treatment and control variables as the 
model presenting in the first column of Table I. Since there are 15 regressions, we chose to 
simplify the exposition and only report on the significance of the dummy variable for the loss 
treatment. The only assignments in which the average grades were statistically higher in the loss 
treatment were Problem Set 3 (second to last problem set), Quiz 7 (last quiz), Exam 3 (last day of 
class) and the Final Exam (finals week). Significance levels are denoted with asterisks.  
Table II: Average grades by assignment and treatment 
PS1 PS2 PS3* PS4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7** E1 E2 E3*** Final* 
Gains 18.39 16.70 15.39 18.24 16.03 16.39 15.70 15.67 14.79 17.03 17.76 72.39 72.91 75.33 63.74 
Losses 18.23 16.25 16.16 18.09 16.31 15.19 14.22 15.62 15.04 17.55 18.58 69.62 74.38 78.34 68.71 
Notes: Students’ grades for each individual assignment listed in Table II were regressed (using OLS) on the same 
treatment and control variables from the first model in Table I. The symbols *,**,*** indicate that the grades in the 
loss treatment were significantly higher than grades in the gain treatment at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. The grades for all other assignments were not statistically different between the two treatments. The 
coefficient estimates were suppressed for a cleaner exposition of the main findings.  
We again turn our attention to the final exam. Recall that before students attempt the final they 
have full information regarding all of the other graded assignments. For those in the gain 
treatment, their course grades are posted given a final exam score of zero, while those in the loss 
treatment see their course grades given a final exam score of 100 percent.  
In total, 73 (66 percent) and 31 (47 percent) students attempted the final in the loss and 
gain treatments, respectively. The two percentages are statistically different at the 0.01 level 
indicating that a larger fraction of students attempted the final when their grades were framed as 
losses as opposed to gains. To check the robustness of this result, we estimate a series of probit 
models where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the student attempted the final 
(and a zero otherwise). We use the same treatment and controls as the regressions in Table I with 
the addition of a variable containing the student’s total points before attempting the final. The 
first model uses the pooled dataset (145 observations) and the results are contained in Table III. 
We find that students are more likely to attempt the final in the loss treatment (significant at the 
0.01 level). We also see that in the pooled model, the more points a student has earned the less 
likely they are to attempt the final. Again, we stratify the sample by the two treatments and see 
that this effect is qualitatively the same for both treatments. However, it is less significant in the 
loss treatment.  
Table III: Probit regressions on the likelihood of attempting the final exam 
Pooled Gains Losses 
Loss Treatment 1.959*** 
(0.496) 
--- --- 
Attendance 0.006 
(0.054) 
0.302** 
(0.136) 
-0.100 
(0.075) 
GPA -0.600 
(0.379) 
-1.209* 
(0.681) 
-0.471 
(0.493) 
Stats 1 Grade 0.020 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.034) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
SAT 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Hours Studying -0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.042 
(0.026) 
Female 0.075 
(0.272) 
-0.544 
(0.478) 
0.266 
(0.378) 
Points before final -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
Constant 5.674*** 
(1.952) 
5.768* 
(3.319) 
9.069*** 
(3.446) 
N 145 56 89 
chi-squared 42.65 20.88 22.90 
p-value (chi-squared) 0.000 0.004 0.002 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively.   
Finally, we regress the final exam scores on the same treatment and control variables from 
Tables I and II. In the first model we include the variables from the initial set of regressions in 
Table I. Here (column one, Table IV) we observe a positive effect on final exam grades from the 
loss treatment, but only at the 0.10 level. When we include the variable for total points earned 
before the final (column two, Table IV), the treatment effect is no longer significant. It appears 
that the loss-treatment effect on final exam scores is weak, and highly sensitive to how well 
students are doing prior to taking the exam. When stratifying by treatment, we see that the more 
points students have before the final exam the better they do on the final, but only in the loss 
treatment.   
Table IV: Final exam grade as a function of treatment and control variables 
Pooled Pooled Gains Losses 
Loss Treatment 5.046* 
(2.823) 
-5.857 
(4.752) 
--- --- 
Attendance -0.257 
(0.429) 
-0.644 
(0.433) 
-3.074 
(1.282) 
-0.769 
(0.503) 
GPA 5.381 
(3.878) 
2.443 
(3.858) 
11.479 
(7.837) 
-0.953 
(5.049) 
Stats 1 Grade 0.234 
(0.213) 
-0.005 
(0.221) 
0.141 
(0.522) 
-0.030 
(0.257) 
SAT -0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
Hours Studying 0.304 
(0.252) 
0.200 
(0.244) 
0.125 
(0.509) 
0.228 
(0.308) 
Female 1.727 
(2.877) 
3.018 
(2.792) 
6.009 
(6.413) 
2.492 
(3.448) 
Points before final --- 0.097*** 
(0.035) 
0.079 
(0.064) 
0.109** 
(0.049) 
Constant 29.238* 
(18.022) 
30.332* 
(17.254) 
7.251 
(41.738) 
33.955 
(21.178) 
N 82 82 23 59 
R-squared 0.125 0.209 0.393 0.157 
F 1.50 2.41 1.39 1.36 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively.   
4. Conclusion
We manipulated the grading scheme across multiple statistics classes in the same semester to test 
if loss-aversion behavior can be exploited to improve student performance. Our design consisted 
of two treatments, one in which students started with 100 percent of total points and received 
feedback in “points lost” and another in which students started with zero and received feedback 
in “points earned”. Consistent with our hypothesis we find that when controlling for other factors 
that may affect student performance, students that were part of the loss treatment earned 
statistically higher grades than students in the gain treatment. While robust to different model 
specifications, the difference is only weakly significant (ranging from 0.05 to 0.10 levels).  
Apostolova-Mihaylova et al. (2015) was the first published study to examine how 
framing grades as gains compared to losses can affect student performance. Our study was 
conducted during the same academic year (without knowledge of each others’ projects) and our 
results differ in meaningful ways. First, we do not observe a gender effect. Second, we observe 
higher average grades when grades are framed as losses compared to gains when controlling for 
other factors that potentially affect performance. Third, we observe a timing effect in which the 
impact of framing grades as losses is more influential later in the semester. Fourth, students in 
the loss treatment were significantly more likely to attempt the final exam, which replaces the 
lowest of the three semester exams. Although preliminary, our results suggest that a simple 
manipulation of how grades are framed in the classroom can be a costless way to exploit loss 
aversion behavior and lead to greater student achievement.  
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